Petitioner Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles housing authority sought a writ of mandamus to require respondent chairman to perform certain of his duties alleged to be enjoined upon him by law.

The chairman contended that acting as requested by the housing authority was unconstitutional. The court held that the acts requested by the housing authority were constitutional. According to the court, the slum-clearance and low-rent housing project statutes were constitutional because they enhanced the public welfare. The San Diego business law held that the issuance of bonds for the construction and the operation of housing projects was merely ancillary of the underlying purpose of slum-clearance. According to the court, the elimination of unsafe and dilapidated tenements was a legitimate object for the exercise of police power. The court held that eminent domain could be used to clear land for public housing purposes because such activities served a public purpose and need. The court also found that the Housing Authorities Law, Cal. Gen. Laws tit. 2, Act 3483 (1938) and the Housing Cooperation Law, Cal. Gen. Laws, Tit. 2, Act. 3484 (1938) were constitutional and did not violate equal protection or debt limitation provisions, and did not impermissibly delegate legislative power.

The court issued a preliminary writ of mandate.

Appellant juvenile offender challenged a judgment of the Superior Court of Solano County (California), which found that she violated Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 602 by leaving home without consent, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11530, by possessing marijuana, and the local curfew ordinance, which appellant alleged was unconstitutional. The juvenile court adjudicated appellant a ward of the court, committing her to the California Youth Authority.

Pursuant to a supplemental petition filed in the juvenile court, appellant juvenile offender was found to have violated Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 602, for leaving her foster parents’ home without their consent, and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11530, for possession of marijuana. When she was found wandering the streets, the officers placed appellant under arrest for violation of the city’s curfew ordinance. The juvenile court ordered her to continue as a ward of the court, and committed her to the youth authority. On appeal, appellant argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest her under the ordinance, which was unconstitutionally broad. The court affirmed the judgment, finding that once the officers ascertained that appellant was a juvenile, they had probable cause to arrest her and perform a search incident to the arrest. Further, the court found the ordinance constitutional, holding that to forbid juveniles from loitering in the streets during nighttime hours had a real and substantial relationship to the dual goal of protection of children and the community, and the ordinance did not unduly restrict the rights of minors in view of these interests.

The court affirmed the order of the juvenile court, finding that under the totality of the circumstances there was probable cause for arresting and searching appellant juvenile offender for violating the curfew ordinance, and that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally broad because juveniles could be treated differently from adults, for their protection.